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Akiachak Native Community v. United States Department of Interior, 
827 F.3d 100 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
 
Lillian M. Alvernaz 
 
Alaska Native Tribes have long been classified differently than 
the federally recognized Indian tribes in the rest of the country. The 
Akiachak decision contributes to the shifting treatment of Alaska Native 
Tribes and clarifies their relationship with the federal government.1 The 
ability to put land into trust is essential to the protection of generations to 
come and the exercise of sovereign authority.2 By enabling Alaska Native 
tribes the ability to petition to put tribally owned fee land in trust, the DOI 
promotes and encourages tribal self-governance and empowerment.3 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
After merely a decade of litigation, the Court determined 
Akiachak Native Community v. United States Department of Interior  to 
be moot because of the significant changes the Department of the Interior 
(“DOI”) had made to regulations stipulating when the federal government 
can take land into trust.4 In an attempt to persuade the DOI to consider 
taking land into trust, the  Akiachak Native Community, Chalkyitsik 
Village, and Tuluksak Native Community (together “Akiachak”)  
emphasized the importance of trust status to Alaska Native Tribes: “trust 
status would ‘ensure the protection’ of these lands ‘for future generations 
of tribal members,’” and give Alaska Native Tribes the ability to “‘assert 
undisputed jurisdiction over these lands.’”5  
Traditionally, the DOI barred itself from putting fee land into trust 
in Alaska.6 The 1980 version of the purpose and scope of land acquisitions 
under the DOI, 25 C.F.R. §151.1 (“Alaska Exception”), restricted the 
DOI’s land-into-trust abilities to all but one tribe in Alaska.7 In an effort 
to change this restriction, Akiachak filed suit against the DOI, asserting 
that the Alaska Exception violated the Indian Reorganization Act’s 
(“IRA”) nondiscrimination provision, the Constitution, and 
Administrative Procedure Act.8 In addition to Akiachak’s complaint, they 
also sought an injunction requiring the DOI to waive the Alaska Exception 
                                                     
1. Akiachak Native Cmty., v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 827 
F.3d 100 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
2. Id. at 102. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 105. 
5. Id.  
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 103. 
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and consider its applications of land to trust.9 The State of Alaska 
intervened to retain the Alaska Exception.10 
The District Court for the District for Columbia found for 
Akiachak and found the DOI’s interpretation of the Alaska Exception to 
be erroneous.11 Following the district court’s finding, the DOI amended 
their regulations and voluntarily dropped the appeal.12 The State of Alaska 
appealed in an effort to preclude the DOI from putting tribal land in trust 
within the exterior boundaries of the state.13 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held the controversy between 
Akiachak and the DOI moot, and dismissed Alaska’s appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction.14 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The relationship between Indian people and the federal 
government is unique. Within this relationship is the distinct association 
Alaska Native Tribes maintain with the federal government.15 The IRA of 
1934 authorized the Secretary of Interior to obtain trust lands and establish 
new reservations for federally recognized tribes.16 The IRA considered 
Alaska Natives to be Indians within the meaning of the IRA, but it 
excluded Alaska from the Secretary of Interior’s ability to take land into 
trust.17 However, the ability to take land into trust was extended when 
Alaska was still a territory, through an amendment to the IRA, the Act of 
May 1, 1936.18 Additionally, the Secretary of Interior was authorized to 
establish reservations on land previously designated for Indian use.19 This 
amendment additionally established seven reservations and the federal 
government obtained certain properties in trust.20 
Further, Congress added an antidiscrimination provision almost 
sixty years later.21 In this additional amendment, Act of May 31, 1994, the 
DOI was prohibited from “classifying, enhancing, or diminishing the 
privileges and immunities available to a federally recognized Indian tribe 
                                                     
9. Id. 
10. Id.  
11. Id. at 102. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id.; see Act of May 1, 1936, 25 U.S.C. § 473a transferred to 25 
U.S.C.A. § 5119 (2016). 
19. Id.; see Act of May 1, 1936, 25 U.S.C. § 473a transferred to 25 
U.S.C.A. § 5119 (2016). 
20. Id.; see Act of May 1, 1936, 25 U.S.C. § 473a transferred to 25 
U.S.C.A. § 5119 (2016). 
21. Id.  
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relative to the privileges and immunities available to other federally 
recognized tribes.”22 
However, claims of aboriginal rights by Alaska Natives remained 
unresolved.23 Aboriginal rights are “possessory rights of Indian tribes to 
their aboriginal lands…extinguishable only by the United States.”24 
Potential aboriginal rights claims hindered the new state of Alaska from 
obtaining land from the US government under the Alaska Statehood Act.25 
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”) of 1971 was passed 
and “designed to settle all land claims by Alaska Natives” by extinguishing 
aboriginal rights claims.26 ANCSA annulled all but one existing 
reservation: the Metlakatla Indians who had no aboriginal rights claims 
because they immigrated from Canada.27 As a result, Alaska Natives were 
compensated forty-four million acres of land and $962.5 million, 
dispersed amongst Alaska Native shareholder owned corporations.28 
After ANCSA was enacted, Congress cancelled various 
amendments to the IRA regarding land use for Alaska Natives, including 
the Act of May 1, 1936.29 Notably, the IRA Alaska trust stipulation was 
never repealed by Congress.30 The 1978 “Fredericks Opinion” to a tribe’s 
application of land into trust outlined the DOI’s authority under ANCSA.31 
The Fredericks Opinion established that “Congress intended permanently 
to remove from trust status all Native land in Alaska except allotments and 
the Annette Island Reserve.”32 The DOI codified the Fredericks Opinion 
in 25 C.F.R. §151.1 (1980), preventing the acquisition of trust land in the 
State of Alaska.33 This “Alaska Exception” was the core of Akiachak’s 
complaint.34 
Akiachak sought declaratory relief, specifically seeking an order 
determining that the Alaska Exception “violated the IRA’s 
antidiscrimination provision, the Constitution, and the Administrative 
Procedure Act.”35 Additionally, Akiachak requested an injunction 
                                                     
22. 25 U.S.C. § 5123(g) (1934). 
23. Akiachak, 827 F.3d at 102. 
24. Id. at 103 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Oneida 
Cnty., 94 S. Ct. 772, 668 (1974)). 
25. Id. at 103. 
26. Id. (quoting Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t., 118 S. 
Ct. 948 (1998)). 
27. Id. (citing Venetie, 522 U.S. at 523-524). 
28. Id. (quoting Venetie, 522 U.S. at 524 (citing 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1695, 
1607, 1613)). 
29. Id. 
30. Id.; see Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94–579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2792. 
31. Id. 
32. Id.; see Memorandum from Thomas W. Fredericks, Associate 
Solicitor, Indian Affairs, to Forrest Gerard, Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs 3 (Sept. 
15, 1978). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
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requiring the DOI “to implement the acquisition of land into trust 
procedures without regard to the bar against Alaska tribes [and] to accept 
and consider Plaintiff’s request to have lands in Alaska taken into trust.”36 
The State of Alaska intervened in the district court to defend the 
validity of the Alaska Exception.37 Alaska filed an answer containing 
numerous affirmative defenses and a prayer for relief, but no crossclaim 
against the DOI or counterclaim against Akiachak, nor any other 
crossclaim or counterclaim.38 The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Akiachak and held the Alaska Exception to be in 
violation of the IRA.39  
The district court ordered the parties to brief the appropriate 
remedy.40 Akiachak dropped its injunctive relief claim and asked the court 
to remand to the Secretary for “curative rulemaking.”41 The district court 
severed and vacated the Alaska Exception in 25 C.F.R. § 151.1.42 
Subsequently, the district court granted Alaska’s motion to enjoin the DOI 
from converting land into trust pending appeal.43 
The DOI initially appealed the district court’s holding, but later 
issued and sought comment on a potential rule eliminating the Alaska 
Exception.44 The DOI ultimately dropped its appeal and filed a motion to 
dismiss Alaska’s appeal for lack of standing.45 Alaska filed a motion to 
stop the DOI rulemaking.46 The district court denied Alaska’s motion and 
the DOI finalized its rule to remove the Alaska Exception.47 
After it issued the final rule to remove the Alaska Exception, the 
DOI filed a separate motion to dismiss Alaska’s appeal as moot, and 
asserted that its administrative action to remove the Alaska Exception 
overtook the district court’s judgment.48 Akiachak joined the DOI on both 
motions.49 Alaska opposed both motions and argued that ANCSA prevents 
the federal government from acquiring new trust land.50 The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia dismissed Alaska’s appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction.51 
 
                                                     
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 104. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. (quoting Akiachak Native Cmty. v. Jewell (Akichak II), 995 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2013)). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. (citing Akiachak Native Cmty. v. Jewell (Akichak III), 995 F. 
Supp. 2d 7, 18-19 (D.D.C. 2014)). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 102. 
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II.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  The Alaska Exception violated the IRA 
 
The district court opined that the Act of May 1, 1936 “expressly 
granted the Secretary authority to take land into trust in Alaska.”52 In its 
determination, the district court agreed with Akiachak and the DOI that 
such authority survived ANCSA.53 Alaska’s argument that ANCSA 
repealed the Secretary’s authority to take land into trust outside of the 
Metlakatla reservation was considered, but the district court ultimately 
based its decision on the “weight of the textual and structural evidence, 
and the strength of the presumption against implicit repeals.”54 The district 
court held the Alaska Exception in violation of the IRA’s 
antidiscrimination provision because it prevented the Secretary from 
considering trust petitions from non-Metlakatlan Alaska Natives.55 While 
the court of appeals agreed with the findings of the district court, it vacated 
the district court’s decision as moot.56 
 
B.  Alaska failed to file a separate, independent claim 
 
Each of Akiachak’s causes of action in its complaint challenged 
the soundness of the Alaska Exception.57 Since the DOI invalidated the 
Alaska Exception through its revised regulation, the district court lacked 
authority “to affect Akiachak’s rights relative to it, thus making this case 
classically moot for lack of a live controversy.”58 Jurisdiction to decide a 
case or controversy is controlled by the affirmative claims for relief sought 
in the complaint, counterclaims, or crossclaims.59   
Here, Alaska failed to assert a counterclaim or crossclaim when it 
intervened in the district court as a defendant.60 The court of appeals 
reasoned, “affirmative defenses made ‘in response to a pleading’ are not 
themselves claim for relief.”61 Further, “a request for relief that amounts 
to no more than denial of the plaintiff’s demand” is an answer, “not a 
separate claim for affirmative relief that expands the court’s 
jurisdiction.”62 
                                                     
52. Id. at 104 (citing Akiachak Native Cmty. v. Salazar (Akiachak I), 
935 F. Supp. 2d 195, 203 (D.D.C. 2013)). 
53. Id. (citing Akiachak I, 935 F. Supp. at 203-204). 
54. Id. (quoting Akiachak I, 935 F. Supp. at 208). 
55. Id. (citing Akiachak I, 935 F. Supp. at 210-211). 
56. Id. at 115. 
57. Id. at 105. 
58. Id. at 106. 
59. Id. (“[T]he scope of a federal court’s jurisdiction to resolve a case 
or controversy is defined by the affirmative claims to relief sought in the complaint 
or…any counterclaims or crossclaims.” Id. “[A] case will remain justiciable only so 
long as at least one of those issues remains live.” Id. at 107). 
60. Id. at 107. 
61. Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). 
62. Id. 
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C.  The elimination of the Alaska Exception by the DOI mooted this case  
 
The district court severed and vacated the Alaska Exception 
provision in 25 C.F.R. § 151.1 after it ordered the parties to brief the 
appropriate remedy.63 While the DOI agreed with the district court’s 
severance and vacation of the Alaska Exception, it asserted that this 
holding was not the reason the DOI decided to eradicate the Alaska 
Exception.64  Instead, it was the DOI’s action that mooted this case.65 The 
district court’s ruling was then overtaken by the DOI’s decision to remove 
the Alaska Exception.66 
After consideration of the history of Alaska Native trust 
ownership in Alaska, the DOI established a new rule.67 The DOI 
determined that the formulation of a new rule to give Alaska Native Tribes 
the ability to take land into trust could encourage and promote economic 
development, support Alaska Native Tribes in protecting and providing 
for their members, and “give additional tools to Alaska Native 
communities to address serious issues,” tribe by tribe.68 Upon eliminating 
the Alaska Exception, the DOI concluded that there was “no legal 
impediment to taking land into trust in Alaska,” and there are several 
reasons to afford Alaska Native Tribes this ability.69 The court of appeals 
sided with the DOI’s determination in holding the claim as moot.70 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The court of appeals decision in Akiachak is relevant to the 
development of the status of Alaska Native Tribes within the greater 
context of federal Indian policy. Affording Alaska Native Tribes the 
ability to apply for land into trust furthers Alaska Native interest in equal 
treatment among all federally recognized tribes. Finally, Akiachak 
expands tribal sovereignty and self-governance through regulation and 
protection by Alaska Natives for Alaska Natives on tribally owned land.  
                                                     
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 113 (citing Akiachak III, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 76, 891). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 112. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 113. 
70. Id. 
